The expressive truth functions of two-valued logic have all been characterized, as have the expressive unary truth functions of finitely-many-valued logic. This paper introduces some techniques for identifying expressive functions in three-valued logics.

We are going to explore a property of truth functions known as "expressiveness." Before subjecting readers to the long-winded explanation of what that property is, I would like to indicate why the property is worth investigating.
Pick any n-valued sentential logic. Suppose p is a sentential variable. Consider, for the moment, those sentences with occurrences of no sentential variables other than p. Call these the p-sentences. Let D k be the set of p-sentences that receive a designated value when p receives the value k. D k is the set of p-sentences that are true in some way when p is true or untrue in manner k. Such a set is sometimes called a . Suppose, for any values k and j, that D k ⊆ D j only if k = j. This means the theories D 1 , . . . , D n are pairwise distinct: D k = D j if k = j. It also means they are maximally satisfiable in the set of p-sentences: if φ is a p-sentence not in D k , then, no matter what value p has, some member of D k ∪ {φ} will be untrue in some way. Since each p-sentence has one of only n n possible truth tables, each theory D k is finite modulo logical equivalence (i.e., modulo identity of truth tables). Take a representative from each logical equivalence class and form new sets ∆ 1 (p), . . . , ∆ n (p) by throwing out all the members of each D k except any of those representatives that might be present. (So each member of D k is represented by exactly one equivalent sentence in ∆ k (p).)
Now return to the full language of our logic. Given any sentence φ, form the set ∆ k (φ) by replacing every occurrence of p in every member of ∆ k (p) with an occurrence of φ. We can show that an interpretation will assign a designated value to each member of ∆ k (φ) if and only if it assigns k to φ. That is, the members of ∆ k (φ) jointly affirm that φ has value k. The right-left direction is easy: an interpretation assigning k to φ will assign a designated value to each member of ∆ k (φ). Here is a proof of the converse. F(p) and G(p) will be p-sentences. F(φ) will be the result of replacing each occurrence of p in F(p) with an occurrence of φ. f will be the unary truth function whose graph is the same as the truth table for F(p). M(φ) will be the value an arbitrary interpretation M assigns to the sentence φ. Now suppose G(p) ∈ D k . Let F(p) be the member of ∆ k (p) equivalent to G(p). Then F(φ) ∈ ∆ k (φ). Suppose M assigns a designated value to each member of ∆ k (φ). Then M(F(φ)) is designated, as is f(M(φ)). So F(p) receives a designated value when p receives the value M(φ). That is, F(p) ∈ D j where j = M(φ). So G(p) ∈ D j . More generally, D k ⊆ D j . So k = j = M(φ).
A key assumption here was that D k ⊆ D j only if k = j. We have seen that if D 1 , . . . , D n have this property, if they are pairwise distinct and maximally satisfiable in the set of p-sentences, then, for each value k and sentence φ, we can use finitely many sentences to assert that φ has value k. Here are two reasons to take an interest in this.
Forms of assertion and denial. Say that one denies a sentence when one attributes some form of untruth to it. In assessing the expressive capacities of some language, one might inquire about how many forms of denial it affords. If D 1 , . . . , D n are distinct and maximally satisfiable, then a partial answer is, "The language provides at least as many forms of denial as there are undesignated values." After all, to attribute an undesignated value j to a sentence φ, one need only assert each member of ∆ j (φ). The same holds for forms of assertion. One can affirm that φ is true in some unspecified way by asserting φ. One can affirm that φ is true in some particular way by asserting each member of ∆ k (φ) for some designated k. Students of many-valued resolution might find it helpful to recall the intended meaning of signed formulas or meta-language literals. (See, for example, [1] .) A literal p k is meant to assert that sentence p has value k. If D 1 , . . . , D n are distinct and maximally satisfiable, then the content of each such literal is captured by finitely many object-language sentences. We now consider one reason this might be convenient.
Formalizability. Suppose we can translate each meta-language literal using finitely many sentences of the object-language. Then a generalization of a wellknown algorithm yields a deductive system that is sound and complete with respect to our logic. Beall and van Fraassen [2, pp. 182-185] provide a nice exposition. (See also [3] and [8] .) They presuppose, for each value k, a predicate F k such that F k (φ) receives a designated value in an interpretation if and only if φ receives the value k in that interpretation. That is, they assume there is a single sentence announcing that φ has value k. It presents no problem, though, if several (but still only finitely many) sentences are needed to disclose the value of φ. A few easy modifications allow us to use the members of ∆ k (φ) in place of the sentence
Now what does this have to do with expressiveness? Suppose f is an nvalued truth function with our (as yet undefined) property: suppose f is expressive. Actually, "expressive" is shorthand for "expressive with respect to a set of designated values." So suppose f is expressive with respect to the designated values of our logic. Suppose, further, that the graph of f is the same as the truth table of some sentence in our logic. If f is unary, then D 1 , . . . , D n will be maximally satisfiable in the set of p-sentences and, as long as D 1 , . . . , D n are pairwise distinct, our logic will have the nice properties just discussed. This is the case no matter what n is. (See Theorem 4.3 of [8] .) But suppose now that n = 3, our values being 1, 2, and 3 with just 1 designated. Suppose f is expressive with respect to {1}. If f(1 . . . 1) = 1, then, again, D 1 , . . . , D n will be maximally satisfiable in the set of p-sentences and, as long as D 1 , . . . , D n are all distinct, our logic will have the nice properties just discussed. (See Theorem 6 below.) There are various results of this sort. The general idea is that we can confirm that a logic has certain desirable properties (say, an elegant formalization with a straightforward Henkin-style completeness proof ) if we can show that an expressive function of one kind or another is definable in the logic. This makes it desirable to have techniques for identifying expressive functions.
 
Since expressiveness began life as a property of closure spaces, it will be helpful to review a bit of closure space theory. Pick some universe of discourse S. A   C on this universe is a set of subsets of S closed under intersection. That is, W ∈ C whenever W ⊆ C (letting ∅ = S). The members of C are known as the  . A subset W of C  a closed set B if and only if B = W. B is  if and only if it is reduced by some subset of C \ {B}. If A ⊆ S, then Cl(A), the  of A, is the intersection of all the members of C that contain A. In a  closure space, if x ∈ S and A ⊆ S, then x will belong to Cl(A) only if it belongs to the closure of some finite subset of A. If B ∈ C, then B is   if and only if B sits just below S in the lattice of closed sets: that is, S is the only member of C that properly contains B. [10, 11] .) For each interpretation M, let the  D M be the set of sentences assigned a designated value by M. Each irreducible set is a theory. (S, the set of all sentences, is reducible because S = ∅. Every other closed set is the intersection of the theories that contain it.) So C is expressive if and only if each of its irreducible theories is maximally consistent. We are interested in the circumstances under which this occurs. In particular, we are interested in whether the definability of certain truth functions might guarantee expressiveness.
 
Suppose our logic is two-valued. Suppose the function g returns a T when we feed it nothing but F's and returns F for at least one sequence of inputs. Say, for example, that g(FFFF) = T and g(T FFT ) = F. Suppose there is a sentence θ in our language whose truth table is exactly the graph of g. So θ(φψψφ) is T when φ and ψ are both F, while θ(φψψφ) is F when φ is T and ψ is F. Then we can show that our logic has a property a bit stronger than expressiveness: each of its consistent theories (each of its theories other than S) is maximally consistent. To confirm this, suppose D M = S. If M assigns F to only one sentence, then D M is maximally consistent and we are done. Suppose M assigns F to at least two sentences. Suppose D N properly contains D M . Let φ be a sentence that M considers false but N considers true. Let ψ be any other sentence that M considers false. Then M thinks θ(φψψφ) is true. N thinks a sentence is true whenever M thinks it is true. So N thinks θ(φψψφ) is true. But this means N cannot think ψ is false. ψ was an arbitrary falsehood of M. So N thinks all of M's falsehoods are truths. So N thinks everything is true. That is, D N = S. So S is the only theory that properly contains D M . So S is the only closed set that properly contains
Every two-valued logic with a sentence expressing g is expressive. This leads us to say that g itself is expressive in the sense of "expressiveness guaranteeing" or "expressiveness producing." To be pedantic, g is expressive with respect to the choice of {T } as the set of designated values (a qualification that can be omitted without fear of confusion in the two-valued case). We are interested in characterizing expressive n-valued truth functions in general. The two-valued ones have all been characterized [7] , as have all the unary ones for each choice of n [8] . We are going to investigate some of the remaining functions, with special emphasis on the three-valued ones. First, however, a brief detour that will further motivate this project.

Intuitionist and classical connectives do not always mix well. If you have a million connectives obeying the rules for intuitionist negation and even one of them satisfies the classical principle of double negation elimination, then they all do. If you have a million connectives obeying the rules for the intuitionist conditional and even one of them satisfies Peirce's law, then they all do. Our investigations into expressive functions help us to identify deductive properties that give connectives this power of assimilation.
For example, there is an algorithm that takes us from the truth table for an expressive two-valued function like g to a pair of sequents that will "deintuitionize" each intuitionist conditional and negation. To see an example of how this works, consider again our two-valued logic and our function g. We first introduce a new connective with the stipulation that
. If A and B are sets of sentences, we say that A | = B if and only if B intersects each theory that contains A. (That is, an interpretation assigning T to each member of A will assign T to at least one member of B.) Then we can verify the following.
• {φ, (φ ψ)} | = {ψ}
Now go to any deductive system featuring the corresponding sequents.
• φ, (φ ψ) ψ
Suppose this system also features a connective ¬ obeying the intuitionistically valid principle that ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k ¬φ whenever φ, ψ 1 , . . ., ψ k ¬φ. Then we can argue as follows.
Since this last line is a version of excluded middle, we see that has assimilated or "de-intuitionized" ¬.
has a similar effect on any connective satisfying modus ponens and the deduction theorem. This means that anyone who wants to speak an intuitionist language and a language expressing g will have to prevent the latter from infiltrating the former. This holds for any expressive two-valued truth function.
Things are just a bit more complicated when we add more truth-values. Here is an example. Go to a three-valued logic where 2 and 3 are designated, but 1 is not. Suppose the function h has a matrix of the following form. (The idea is that an empty cell can be filled by any value drawn from {1, 2, 3}.)
This means that h(11) = h(22) = 3, h(12) = 2, and h(31) = 1. Introduce the connective with the stipulation that M(φ ψ) = h(M(φ)M(ψ)). It turns out that h is expressive. One proof of this draws attention to the following facts.
•
As before, go to any deductive system featuring the corresponding sequents.
Suppose we encounter a connective ¬ behaving as above. (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k ¬φ whenever φ, ψ 1 , . . . , ψ k ¬φ.) Then we can argue as follows.
So h is an assimilator and anyone wishing to speak an intuitionist language and a language expressing h will have to prevent the latter from infiltrating the former. All expressive functions are assimilators. (See [5, pp. 161-162 and 203] , and [6, pp. 122-124] .) When we identify expressive functions, we identify logical notions that would-be intuitionists need to keep carefully at bay. This is yet another reason to take an interest in these functions.
 
We now define our terms with greater care and proceed to some results. A -  is a quadruple D, L, CON, where D (the set of designated values) is a non-empty proper subset of {1, 2, 3}, L is a non-empty set of variables, CON is a non-empty set of connectives, and is an operator that assigns a member of {1, 2, 3} to each 0-ary member of CON and assigns a function f : {1, 2, 3} k → {1, 2, 3} to each k-ary member of CON when k > 0. The sentences of such a logic are the members of L, the 0-ary members of CON, and any expressions F(φ 1 , . . . , φ k ) where φ 1 , . . . , φ k are sentences and F is a k-ary member of CON. An  is any homomorphism that assigns members of {1,2,3} to sentences. That is, if M is an interpretation in a logic
for every interpretation M in that logic. A logic - a truth function if and only if one of its sentences does. We also say that a connective F expresses the function F .
Given any logic and any of its interpretations M, we let the  D M be the set of sentences assigned a designated value by M. D M is  if and only if there are sentences that do not belong to D M . A theory is -  if and only if it is consistent but is not a proper subset of any consistent theory. A set of sentences is  if and only if it is a subset of some theory. A theory is   if and only if it is not a proper subset of any theory. (If every theory is consistent, then maximal consistency is equivalent to maximal satisfiability.) A theory is  if and only if it is the intersection of theories distinct from itself. If S is the set of all our sentences, we let ∅=S. So any inconsistent theory would be reducible (since it would be the result of applying to the empty set of theories). A logic is expressive if and only if all its irreducible theories are maximally consistent.
Say that a D- is one whose set of designated values is D. A truth function is D- if and only if every D-logic that expresses the function is expressive. Unlike properties such as functional completeness, the expressiveness of a function can depend on our choice of designated values.
If a logic has just one variable, we adopt a special notation for its interpretations and theories. We let M i be the interpretation that assigns truth-value i to the one variable. We let D i be the set of sentences assigned a designated value by M i .
We now establish four lemmas that apply to any finitely-many-valued logics (not just the three-valued ones).
Proof: To say that f is not D-expressive is to say that some non-expressive D-logic expresses f. We need just one example, the simpler the better. So consider a logic with just one variable p and three connectives F, G, and H. Let F express f. We assume that k / ∈ D and f(k . Proof: Again, we only need one example of a non-expressive D-logic that expresses f. Consider a logic with just one variable p and two connectives F and G. Let F express a function f that returns a designated value only when at least one of its inputs is designated. Let G express a function g such that g(j) is undesignated for every input j. Pick any undesignated value k. Then M k assigns an undesignated value to every sentence. (Proof: an easy induction on the complexity of sentences. Our assumption about f justifies the step from "φ 1 , . . . , φ m are all undesignated" to "F(φ 1 , . . . , φ m ) is undesignated.") So D k is empty whenever k is undesignated. On the other hand, p belongs to D j whenever j is designated. Every theory is consistent, since G(p) does not belong to any theory. So if k is undesignated, D k is irreducible but not maximally consistent. Proof: Once again, we describe a simple non-expressive logic with a connective expressing an f of the indicated sort. Consider a logic with just one variable p and two connectives F and G. Let F express a function f that returns a designated value whenever it receives at least one designated input. G is to be a 0-ary connective (that is, an individual constant). Pick any undesignated value k and let M j (G) = k for every value j. If i is designated, then every sentence in which p occurs belongs to D i . A sentence in which p does not occur will belong to every theory or to none. So D i = D j whenever i and j are both designated. Furthermore, D i ⊂ D j whenever j is designated but i is not. (We get proper containment, ⊂ rather than ⊆, because p ∈ D j if and only if j is designated.) Every theory is consistent, since G does not belong to any theory. So if i is undesignated and D i is not a proper subset of any D j where j is undesignated, then D i is irreducible but not maximally consistent.
From now on, the sets D i are understood to be the theories of a logic with just one variable p and one connective expressing the function f. The idea will be that inspection of these simple logics allows us to tell whether certain functions are expressive.
 4 If D j ∪ {p} is unsatisfiable whenever j /
∈ D, then every theory in every D-logic that expresses f will be maximally consistent.
Proof: We consider a logic whose vocabulary includes p and F, the latter expressing f. We want to show that an arbitrary theory D M is maximally consistent. Suppose φ / ∈ D M . Let M(φ) = j where j is undesignated. For any sentence θ, let θ(p/φ) be the result of replacing every occurrence of p in θ with an occurrence of φ.
But this would mean that D j ∪ {p} is always satisfiable, contrary to our hypothesis. So D M must be consistent.
 - 
The rest of this paper focuses on three-valued logics. Let α(k) = f(k . . . k) for each value k. Let α m+1 = α • α m where α 0 is the identity function. The function α has   if and only if α(k) = k for some value k. Lemma 1 says that k is not a fixed point if f is D-expressive and k / ∈ D. If α(1) = i, α(2) = j, and α(3) = k, then we say α = ijk (that is, we identify α by listing its outputs). There are eight unary functions α : {1, 2, 3} → {1, 2, 3} with no fixed points. They are: 211, 212, 231, 232, 311, 312, 331, 332. If α is D-expressive, then so is f (since every logic that expresses f expresses α). So it is worthwhile to identify the expressive α's. This work has already been done [8, p. 100] . Here are the results. The two derangements 231 and 312 guarantee that every theory is maximally consistent no matter what D is. 211 and 311 guarantee that every theory is maximally consistent if D is either {1} or {2, 3}. If D is either {1} or {2, 3}, then the four remaining functions are not D-expressive.
We turn now to techniques that allow us to identify expressive f's even when the corresponding α's are not expressive. g(kα(k) ). If h(3) = 3, then we are done, since h(2) = 1 while h(α(3)) = 1 and h(α(2)) = 3. Suppose h(3) is 1 or 2. Then g(2α(h(2))) = g(23) = 1 and g (3α(h(3) In an expressive logic, every irreducible theory is maximally consistent. If a {1}-logic expresses a function satisfying the conditions of Theorem 6, all its theories are both irreducible and maximally consistent.
Here is another way to think about Theorem 6. Let the expresssion A | = B mean that B intersects every theory that contains A. That is, every interpretation that assigns a designated value to every member of A will assign a designated value to at least one member of B. Call this situation an . Go to any single-variable {1}-logic in which all three of the D i 's are maximally consistent. We can pick a sentence θ 2 (p) that belongs to D 2 but not to D 1 . We can also pick a sentence θ 3 (p) that belongs to D 3 but not to D 1 . This yields the following entailments.
We can generalize this beyond the single-variable case. Suppose that f is {1}-expressive and that f(1 . . . 1) = 1. This guarantees the maximal consistency of the three D i 's in the single-variable logic for f. So we can find θ 2 (p) and θ 3 (p) as above. Now let φ be any sentence in any {1}-logic expressing f. Let θ 2 (φ) and θ 3 (φ) be the result of replacing every occurrence of p in θ 2 (p) and θ 3 (p) with an occurrence of φ. Then we obtain the following entailments.
will be a member. In either case, D M ∪ {φ} will be unsatisfiable. So D M is maximally consistent if it is consistent. Since f(1 . . . 1) = 1, M cannot assign 1 to every sentence. So D M is consistent.
Let us consider a particularly simple case where we can let θ 2 (φ)=θ 3 (φ). Suppose f is a binary function of the following form.
So, if F expresses f and A expresses α in some {1}-logic, we have the following entailments. (A(φ) )φ) behaves like the classical negation of φ. This allows us to show that every theory in a {1}-logic that expresses f will be maximally consistent.
If we let 1 be our only undesignated value (if we let D = {2, 3}), each entailment is replaced by its dual. So in place of the above entailments we would have the following.
Since these are the very entailments we had before, it is especially obvious in this case that the dual entailments force every theory to be maximally consistent. More generally, if f : {1, 2, 3} k → {1, 2, 3} is {1}-expressive, f(1 . . . 1) = 1, and φ is any sentence in a {2, 3}-logic that expresses f, then there are sentences θ 2 (φ) and θ 3 (φ) with the following properties in that {2, 3}-logic.
If φ is not a member of the theory D M , both θ 2 (φ) and θ 3 (φ) are members and D M ∪{φ} is unsatisfiable. So D M is maximally consistent if it is consistent. Since {φ, θ 2 (φ),θ 3 (φ)} is unsatisfiable, M cannot assign a designated value to every sentence. So D M is consistent. This confirms the following result.
 7 If 1 is not a fixed point, then f is {1}-expressive only if every theory in every {2, 3}-logic that expresses f is maximally consistent.
• f is {2, 3}-expressive.
• D 1 , D 2 , and D 3 are maximally consistent.
• Every theory in every {2, 3}-logic that expresses f is maximally consistent.
The following theorem holds because its hypothesis identifies a sufficient (and, in fact, necessary) condition for the consistency of D 2 and D 3 .
 8
If neither 2 nor 3 is a fixed point and f(j . . . k) = 1 for some m-tuple (j . . . k) ∈ {2, 3} m , then f is {2, 3}-expressive only if every theory in every 2, 3-logic that expresses f is maximally consistent.
We can apply reasoning about entailments to obtain the following. 
 
Given any function f : {1, 2, 3} k → {1, 2, 3} such that f(1 . . . 1) = 1, there is a mechanical (though not particularly elegant) way to test whether f is {1}-expressive. Lemma 1 says that f is not {1}-expressive if either 2 or 3 is a fixed point of α. So we first confirm that f(2 . . . 2) = 2 and f(3 . . . 3) = 3. If f passes this test, we check whether f returns 1 in response to at least one k-tuple of 2's and 3's. If f does not do so, if it returns 1 only when we feed it at least one 1, then, by Lemma 2, f is not {1}-expressive. If, on the other hand, f does pass this test, then we have more work to do. If neither D 2 nor D 3 is a subset of D 1 , then Lemma 4 implies that f is {1}-expressive. So we should check whether D 2 and D 3 each have members absent from D 1 . To do so, we first list all the unary functions definable from f by composition. Here is one way to accomplish that. We go to a logic with just one variable and one connective, the latter expressing f. We start listing sentences in order of complexity, keeping track of the function expressed by each sentence. Since there are only 27 unary functions in a three-valued logic, there must be a j such that every unary function is defined by a sentence of complexity less than j. How do we know when we have reached this upper bound? Well, since an upper bound exists, we will eventually encounter a run of complexities from j to j × k where no new functions are expressed. That is, we will reach a complexity j such that each function expressed by a sentence of complexity less than j × k is already expressed by a sentence of complexity less than j. We can then show that no new function will be expressed by a sentence of higher complexity. (Induction step: if φ 1 , . . . , φ k are each equivalent to a sentence of complexity less than j, then F(φ 1 , . . . , φ k ) is equivalent to a sentence of complexity less than j × k.) Now that we have listed all the unary functions definable from f by composition, we need to conduct two searches to determine whether the theories D 2 and D 3 are subsets of D 1 .
• We search our list for a function g such that g(2) = 1 but g(1) = 1.
• We search our list for a function h such that h(3) = 1 but h(1) = 1.
If each of our searches is successful (if we manage to show that D 2 and D 3 are not subsets of D 1 ), then, by Lemma 4, f is {1}-expressive. Otherwise, by Theorem 6, it is not.
Here is an example. Suppose f is the following binary function.
We determine by inspection that the diagonal function α has no fixed points and that there is an ordered pair of 2's and 3's that causes f to return a 1. (In particular, f(22) = 1.) We then list the unary functions definable from f.
There is no function h on our list such that h(3) = 1 but h(1) = 1. So in a logic with just one variable and one connective expressing f, D 3 would not be maximally consistent. So f is not {1}-expressive. There are 729 binary functions whose diagonal values α(j) are 212. Using our algorithm (and a variety of short-cuts), we can establish that exactly 713 of them are {1}-expressive. Theorem 9 implies that these functions are also the {2, 3}-expressive ones. By permuting the values 2 and 3, we obtain the {1}-expressive and {2, 3}-expressive binary functions whose diagonal values are 331.
There are 729 binary functions whose diagonal values α(j) are 332. Using our algorithm (and a variety of short-cuts), we can establish that exactly 398 of them are {1}-expressive. Theorem 7 implies that all 398 are {2, 3}-expressive. But there are more: an additional 255 are {2, 3}-expressive. We now consider a technique for identifying these functions.
 
Suppose we find sentences θ(φψ) and θ * (φψ) with truth tables of the following form.
φ ψ θ(φψ) θ * (φψ)
Then the following entailments will hold when D = {2, 3}.
• ∅ | = {φ, ψ, θ(φψ)}
These entailments guarantee that every consistent theory is maximally consistent. For suppose D M is consistent but not maximally consistent. There must be at least two sentences φ and ψ that do not belong to D M . θ(φψ) and θ * (φψ) will belong to D M . So ψ will belong to every theory that contains D M ∪ {φ}. ψ could have been any sentence not in D M . So every non-member of D M will belong to every theory that contains D M ∪ {φ}. So no consistent theory will contain D M ∪ {φ} and D M must be maximally consistent after all. To see how this works in particular cases, let f be a binary function of the following form.
If F expresses f and A expresses α, we have the following assignments.
So the following entailments will hold when D = {2, 3}.
Since these entailments guarantee that every consistent theory is maximally consistent, f is {2, 3}-expressive. Using this technique, we can show that 653 binary functions with diagonal values 332 are {2, 3}-expressive. Lemma 3 implies that 64 of the remaining 76 are not {2, 3}-expressive. Theorem 9 guarantees that an additional seven are not {2, 3}-expressive. Here are the five that are left. How do we show that these functions are not {2, 3}-expressive?
Consider a logic with just two variables p and q and two connectives F and G. Let M jk be the interpretation that assigns j to p and k to q. Let D jk be the set of sentences assigned a designated value by M jk . Suppose F expresses one of our five functions. Let G express the following function. Then we can show: We can now tally up the D-expressive binary functions f where α has no fixed points and D is either {1} or {2, 3}. We include a column giving the number of Sheffer (that is, functionally complete) functions [4] . If we consider functions with fixed points, we find an additional 2222 {1}-expressive binary functions (for a total of 7360) and an additional 6356 {2, 3}-expressive binary functions (for a total of 12004). Readers will here be spared the many pages of bookkeeping from which these numbers are derived. A full tally appears below. 
 
We have been investigating those truth functions expressible only in logics whose irreducible theories are all maximally consistent. These, of course, are the expressive functions. A good many of these functions have been identified: all the classical ones [7] , all the unary finitely-many-valued ones [8] , all the binary three-valued ones. Now here is a curious fact: at most one reducible theory appears in any logic expressing any of the functions just listed. When such a theory appears it is always the set of all sentences. So, in any logic expressing one of these functions, every consistent theory is maximally consistent.
Here is the question. Is this always the case? Are expressive functions expressible only in logics whose consistent theories are all maximally consistent? Do expressive functions make it impossible for a reducible theory to be consistent? I would guess this is so. I would guess there is a simple reason why this is so. I would dearly love to know what that reason is.
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